Topic: Goodness and Reward

[lumberjohn]

I often hear believers use anecdotal evidence of religious people that do many charitable acts, and it always makes me wonder what actually motivated those acts and how that factors into society's view of how "good" that person is.  I know, for instance, that many people actually obtain dopamine stimulation by performing acts they themselves view as unselfish or charitable. 

Assume a person (Alex) that receives a dopamine rush in the brain from performing acts of charity and another (Bill) who receives no such effect.  If Alex spends 80% of his time doing charity work, but Bill spends only 10% of his time doing the same, who should be judged a “better” person?  In this case, Alex is rewarded for each such act (in the most direct way possible) while Bill never receives any reward for his charitable behavior.  Externally, however, Alex would seem the most charitable.

This poses another issue.  To the extent such a thing is possible, should parents be encouraged to condition their children to reward themselves internally for charitable acts?  This would certainly make them more likely to engage in such acts in the future, but can what they do truly be described as “good?”  What is the difference here between a heroin addict and a dopamine addict other than the external repercussions of their actions? Each does what he or she does for the stimulating reward so can one truly be judged a better person than the other simply because of the consequences of their actions?

One question I would pose to the forums is whether anyone is aware of any research into these or related issues.  For instance, any research into how internal chemical reward systems are triggered or respond to charitable acts or how many might experience these effects.  Is anyone aware of such research?

[Shibboleth]

There have been studies on altruism. The fact of the matter is there probably isn't any true altruism in the world. The reward gained could be as simple as not having to feel guilty later. I think there are so many reasons why people do and do not do things and they are almost impossible to quantify.

[Anders]

Besides, doing charitable deeds does exactly nothing for your soul's final destination in mainstream Christianity. Zip. Zero. Nothing.

[jmars]

All good deeds are selfish. Even if you do something you absolutely don't want to do, you are doing it to make someone else happy which makes you feel good so there is still a personal reward, or to avoid conflict, which again is a reward for you, etc.

[lumberjohn]

Okay, so where does that leave us on the whole issue of relative morality?  Can we even say that one person is more ethical or moral than another?  If so, what is our basis for doing so?  Does the nature of the reward matter? 

We all talk in terms of people being bad or good or some proxy for those terms.  But if we're all just operating off different reward systems, are we just hypocrites for making such classifications?

[Anders]

You just have to renounce the Kantian claim that only an act which is undertaken solely because of respect for the Moral Obligation is morally good. People can be good even if they do what they do for a selfish reason. Problem solved.

[jmars]

I think you would have analyze the beneficiaries of the reward. There are purely selfish rewards where only the person doing the deed gets rewarded and someone else gets hurt, such as stealing. There are rewards that are beneficial to  others while still hurting someone else like "rob from the rich, steal from the poor". You could also say that the previous is victimless if the rich person doesn't even realize they've been stolen from and can afford to lose some money, etc. You can base a system of morality involving good deeds based on the outcomes, not on the motives.

[lumberjohn]

But then you're judging relative morality based upon external independent factors.  How can the consequences (often unintended or unknown) of an action determine or even be relevant to the initial "correctness" of the decision to act? If in one case someone decides to murder several hundred people in an auditorium, assuming them to be a random assortment, would we deem that act to be an ethical one (and the person to be a "good" person) if we later found out the murdered group was actually composed entirely of terrorists on the cusp of exterminating millions of innocent people?  What if, on the other hand, a "good samaritan" assisted the same group of terrorists whose truck of chemical weapons had broken down on the freeway?  If their assistance proximately resulted in the extermination of millions, would we lump them in with the terrorists in terms of their morality?  I just don't see how that system could possibly work.

It seems to me that relative morality must be judged at the time the decision to act is made rather than on any results that decision may have.  And all we can evaluate at the time are the person's motives.  If all motives are equally selfish, then what criteria can there be for distinguishing good from bad.  If they are equally selfish, how do we determine which motives are more selfish than others?

Ask if you consider John Edwards to be a good man.  Whatever your answer, what is your reasoning?  If you don't believe him to be good, does it matter if he knows he is lying to people about talking to their dead relatives, but believes he is ultimately doing greater good by bringing comfort to millions?  What if he doesn't believe he is doing any good, but just gets an adrenalin rush from his shows?  Does this make him worse?

[lumberjohn]

The last sentence of the second paragraph should have begun "If they are not equally selfish . . ."

[jmars]

But then you're judging relative morality based upon external independent factors.  How can the consequences (often unintended or unknown) of an action determine or even be relevant to the initial "correctness" of the decision to act? If in one case someone decides to murder several hundred people in an auditorium, assuming them to be a random assortment, would we deem that act to be an ethical one (and the person to be a "good" person) if we later found out the murdered group was actually composed entirely of terrorists on the cusp of exterminating millions of innocent people?  What if, on the other hand, a "good samaritan" assisted the same group of terrorists whose truck of chemical weapons had broken down on the freeway?  If their assistance proximately resulted in the extermination of millions, would we lump them in with the terrorists in terms of their morality?  I just don't see how that system could possibly work.

It seems to me that relative morality must be judged at the time the decision to act is made rather than on any results that decision may have.  And all we can evaluate at the time are the person's motives.  If all motives are equally selfish, then what criteria can there be for distinguishing good from bad.  If they are equally selfish, how do we determine which motives are more selfish than others?

Ask if you consider John Edwards to be a good man.  Whatever your answer, what is your reasoning?  If you don't believe him to be good, does it matter if he knows he is lying to people about talking to their dead relatives, but believes he is ultimately doing greater good by bringing comfort to millions?  What if he doesn't believe he is doing any good, but just gets an adrenalin rush from his shows?  Does this make him worse?

I would say that for John Edward (not to be confused with Jon Edwards, the politician) he is definitely in it for the money and knows he's full of shit. He is justifying his actions to himself by claiming he is helping people. I would say that the result is that he is hurting people even if they don't realize it. He takes money from mostly people who need it for other things.

I don't think my version of morality, which is "hurt the least amount of people, most of the time" is based on independent variables. It is based on the consequences of the decisions you make, whether altruistic or otherwise. Motive doesn't matter much when it comes to good deeds. As long as it makes someone happy, and no one else gets hurt. When you are talking about murdering terrorists that is a case by case and not every one agrees. That is similar to the utilitarian philosophy that if you ultimately save more lives than you destroy, you are doing a morally good deed. That is highly subjective and has been argued about for hundreds of years by the best philosophers and can't be solved here.

I watched an online Harvard series on ethics and morality that was really interesting. You might want to check it out if you haven't already.

http://www.justiceharvard.org/

[lukebourassa]

No one does anything they don't want to do unless forced or coerced.

[jmars]

No one does anything they don't want to do unless forced or coerced.

No one forces or coerces me to do the laundry, but I know that if I don't, no one else will, so I do it to avoid the consequences of not having clean clothes for me or my family.

[EhJayArr]

All good deeds are selfish. Even if you do something you absolutely don't want to do, you are doing it to make someone else happy which makes you feel good so there is still a personal reward, or to avoid conflict, which again is a reward for you, etc.

I don't think you can consider a desire to help others "selfish" simply because that's what you feel you should do. Under that definition, anything anybody ever does is selfish. Okay, now we have a totally useless definition of selfish.

A more useful definition of selfish would be putting one's self before others, and of altruistic the putting of others before one's self. That somebody may desire to put others before their self does not make them selfish.

[lumberjohn]

I would agree that "hurt the least amount of people, most of the time" is a good way to live your life.  But the real question is how should we objectively evaluate the morality of others?  The utilitarian approach incorporates motives since someone who kills a group of terrorists because he thinks it will serve the greater good has at least an arguably altruistic intent.  My example was addressing the argument that consequences alone can retroactively determine the morality of an action or actor by positing actors with intentions contrary to the consequences.

Draw a line and place the person you consider most evil on one side and the person you consider most good on the other.  What is your objective criteria for placing them in those positions?  If you chose, for instance, Hitler and Martin Luther King, would it have anything to do with the number of people they affected (negatively and positively)? What if each had lived entirely in virtual reality world such as "the Matrix" in which they made all the same decisions, but those decisions had no actual effect on anyone?  Would that (or should that) make a difference?

[jmars]

All good deeds are selfish. Even if you do something you absolutely don't want to do, you are doing it to make someone else happy which makes you feel good so there is still a personal reward, or to avoid conflict, which again is a reward for you, etc.

I don't think you can consider a desire to help others "selfish" simply because that's what you feel you should do. Under that definition, anything anybody ever does is selfish. Okay, now we have a totally useless definition of selfish.

A more useful definition of selfish would be putting one's self before others, and of altruistic the putting of others before one's self. That somebody may desire to put others before their self does not make them selfish.

Well, perhaps "selfish" is a bad term, but in the context of reward there is no pure altruism, meaning there is always a reward for you for doing it, otherwise we wouldn't do it. Everything good deed that is done has benefits for both giver and recipient. Whether it is praise from others, a "good feeling" inside, or a reciprocity.