Topic: How does the fine tuning argument support theism?

[lumberjohn]

A Plantinga or Craig would ask, incredulously:  We're believe that such an incredibly unlikely combination of constants somehow simply... occurred?  Isn't it vastly more likely they were selected by an Intelligence? 

Of course it isn't.  Because such an intelligence itself is infinitely unlikely.  What we know from all our observations of the universe (cosmology and biology both) is that complexity arises only over time from simplicity.  And the type intelligence they posit is unbelievably complex.  So the hypothesis of a pre-existing intelligence is contrary to everything we know from science about such things.  Multiverses or unlikely combinations, though unproven and perhaps unprovable, are not.

[andrewclunn]

Let me demonstrate with an example.

Imagine that there is a probablistic universe, which is not explicitly causal.  All actions and results are probable in nature rather than causal.  Now within that universe a being exists that creates a region where the probability of certain outcomes happening consistently that it acts (for all intents and purposes) as a casual universe.  In such a fashion a causal universe may exist that is not itself reliant on causality.

Again, you posit your "being" where an alternative design-less explanation may posit acausal cause.  There's no explanation for where the "being" comes from, similarly to how the explanations have to stop somewhere for any competing theory.  There's no virtue in the "being" explanation, on the contrary, it posits the primary cause of literally unimaginable complexity.

now one could argue that perhaps pockets of this virtual causality might emerge without a designer and therefore no designer is needed, however that is not the assertion of multiverse theory.  Mutliverse theory states that several (if not all) possible casual universes exist, so that by virtue of our observing our universe, we know that we must just happen to exist in one that permits life.

The reason why a designer in a container universe is more probable than endless universes emerging within a container universe?  We already know that consciousness can arise, but have no evidence for multiple parallel universes.

There is no godly consciousness that I know of in existence.  All sorts of beings are intelligent in their own way, from bacteria to humans and none of them are capable of constructing or even understanding our universe.

Moreover the incredible complexity of intelligence that would be required to design the universe is a far less parsimonious explanation than an infinite series of universes.  That doesn't speak to probabilities, and you shouldn't describe either theory as more probable for reasons I've covered already, but in terms of Occam's razor positing a superintelligent omnipotent conscious being is a huge leap in complexity.

So, respond to my first paragraph with a response that I anticipated and responded to later (but split up the post so that it appears that you're making a different post).  Stick the term 'godly' in front of consciousness to distort my claim.  Finally hand wave in assertions of what's more probable and mentions Occam's razor for skeptical cred    Care to try again?

[teethering]

I've presented my counter to your post.  If you feel unable to muster a response, so be it.

Incidentally, this is a topic where I cannot conceive of a reason to resort to personal attacks.  I mean I get how things get heated when it comes to questions of ethics and politics, but here...  I just don't get it.

[jomike]

A Plantinga or Craig would ask, incredulously:  We're believe that such an incredibly unlikely combination of constants somehow simply... occurred?  Isn't it vastly more likely they were selected by an Intelligence? 

Of course it isn't.  Because such an intelligence itself is infinitely unlikely.

"Do you know of a scientist or philosopher who has proven that?" asks Theist.  "I'm not aware any such proof in the literature."

What we know from all our observations of the universe (cosmology and biology both) is that complexity arises only over time from simplicity.

"Yes, in accordance with the physical laws set forth by the Designer," suggests Theist. "Actually, for all we know, the entire process could have been guided from the get-go by His (or Its) hand, either wholly, or selectively at crucial stages of development.  We just don't know."

And the type intelligence they posit is unbelievably complex.  So the hypothesis of a pre-existing intelligence is contrary to everything we know from science about such things.  Multiverses or unlikely combinations, though unproven and perhaps unprovable, are not.

"But science can only address the provable," observes Theist.  "If the multiverse -- or whatever versions thereof -- turns out to be unprovable, there's no reason to prefer one unprovable hypothesis over another."

[andrewclunn]

I've presented my counter to your post.  If you feel unable to muster a response, so be it.

Incidentally, this is a topic where I cannot conceive of a reason to resort to personal attacks.  I mean I get how things get heated when it comes to questions of ethics and politics, but here...  I just don't get it.

See and here's where I can't tell if you're trolling me or if you really can't see why your response was a failed attempt.  Oh well.

[Beleth]

Hey guys, put your best manners on, I tweeted about this thread so we're going to get a lot of guests!

[andrewclunn]

Hey guys, put your best manners on, I tweeted about this thread so we're going to get a lot of guests!

Crap.  Okay teethering.  In the name of "best manners" please explain to me why it is much more likely that a container universe based on probability would give rise to several causal universes of different natures rather than a sentient being.

[lumberjohn]

"But science can only address the provable," observes Theist.  "If the multiverse -- or whatever versions thereof -- turns out to be unprovable, there's no reason to prefer one unprovable hypothesis over another."

There are theists that claim to embrace science and attempt to use it to support their arguments and those that don't.  If you are dealing with the latter type, then I would expect responses as you have provided.  In that case, anything goes and there is no way to win the argument because they share virtually no assumptions with you.

But I do think you can make ground with the former type.  If debating one of these, then there is definitely a reason to prefer one unprovable hypothesis over another where one conflicts with science and the other does not.  That is certainly how we evalute testable hypotheses.  What is the statement "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" if not a reason to prefer one explanation (the one that is consistent with science) over another (the one that isn't)?  Why should the rule be any different with respect to untestable claims? 

A claim that violates no scientific principles is more likely than one that does because the latter would invalidate all our scientific progress to date while the former would not.  Isn't that reason enough?

[teethering]

Hey guys, put your best manners on, I tweeted about this thread so we're going to get a lot of guests!

Crap.  Okay teethering.  In the name of "best manners" please explain to me why it is much more likely that a container universe based on probability would give rise to several causal universes of different natures rather than a sentient being.

We cannot speak to likelihood given sample of 1.

We can compare explanation in terms of the complexity of what they insert as the cause.  The problem with inserting intelligence and sentience into any explanation is that intelligence is incredibly complex.  Even your run-of-the-mill human intelligence (which is nowhere sufficient enough to create a universe) is a complex interaction of a multitude of distinct complex-in-their-own-right abilities, like perceiving, processing information, aggregating results, planning action based on it, and then also being able to manipulate the environment and loop it all together into one coherent whole.  Intelligence is not a simple explanation for anything and any time you insert it, there better be a good reason.  If you're going to posit godly intelligence, i.e. intelligence that's capable of designing a universe and having the physical ability to do so, that ups the ante even more.

Such reason is absent in the question of prime mover.  What's required is an acausal cause, something where we can say everything begins and where the infinite regression stops.  The requirement for that prime cause to also be sentient have to come from elsewhere, something else has to justify why such complexity is necessary.  There's nothing inherently intelligent about something being acausal.

And the problem of essentially "something from nothing" is an open problem to all explanations of the origins of the universe.  It's the end point to all "and how does that work?" causal regressions and multiverse and intelligent design and all the rest of the explanations have this same problem.  We just don't know how something comes from nothing.  Multiverse doesn't address that in the slightest, it does, however address the question of the apparent "design-ness" of the universe and therefore it addresses the same question that making the creator of the universe super intelligent would.

[teethering]

I want to stress that talking about "likelihood" and "probability" are really really wrong for this topic.  We have one universe, we don't know what sorts of things are probable and likely in terms of the things that create universes.

[teethering]

Additionally on the nature of intelligence:

We also know (to a rough approximation) the how of human intelligence.  We sort of get how information propagates in the brain, how it gets processed, how it results in behavior via the nervous system and so on.  When you posit sentience as the creation of the universe you also heap on the question of what is the stuff that takes place of the bio-goo that makes us intelligent.

[jomike]

There are theists that claim to embrace science and attempt to use it to support their arguments and those that don't.  If you are dealing with the latter type, then I would expect responses as you have provided.  In that case, anything goes and there is no way to win the argument because they share virtually no assumptions with you.

But I do think you can make ground with the former type.  If debating one of these, then there is definitely a reason to prefer one unprovable hypothesis over another where one conflicts with science and the other does not.

"I certainly regard myself as one of the former type," says Theist, slightly miffed.  "I make no claims contrary to reason.  I'm as interested in evidence as the next person.  I'm not claiming the multiverse hypothesis is necessarily wrong, merely that there's no evidence favoring it over a Creator hypothesis.  At least, not yet.  I'm keeping an open mind.  (Which is more than can be said for many in the atheist camp, I'm afraid.)"

"As to unlikelihood," continued Theist, "well, sure, the idea of an incorporeal, all-powerful Creator strikes us as unlikely.  But how could it be otherwise?  Of course we mammals can't comprehend it.  It's utterly outside our frame of reference.  The astonishing thing would be if we, who only started growing cerebral cortexes the day before yesterday, could grasp it.

"And if twentieth-century science teaches us anything, it's that a hypothesis can't be ruled out merely because it's counterintuitive to us smart apes," said Theist.  "Even Einstein didn't accept the implications of quantum mechanics.  If he could continue to doubt to his dying day even in the face of mounting experimental and theoretical evidence, surely I'm justified to suspend my judgment on this matter until actual evidence should appear,"

That is certainly how we evalute testable hypotheses.  What is the statement "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" if not a reason to prefer one explanation (the one that is consistent with science) over another (the one that isn't)?  Why should the rule be any different with respect to untestable claims?

"With respect, sir," nodded Theist, "that is exactly the point:  We have no evidence one way or the other, at least not yet.  As of now we only have competing hypotheses, neither of which is ruled out by the available evidence."

A claim that violates no scientific principles is more likely than one that does because the latter would invalidate all our scientific progress to date while the former would not.  Isn't that reason enough?

"I'm not convinced a multiverse is necessarily more plausible than a Creator," replied Theist, smiling.  "But I'm willing to entertain the possibility.  Like the man said, truth springs from argument amongst friends."

[lumberjohn]

Jomike,

Your proposed Theist opponent never addresses the point of my post -- which is that untestable theories that are consistent with scientific knowledge are preferred to untestable theories that are not -- the implication of which is that we should embrace the multiverse theory over the intelligent designer theory.  He/she simply proclaims that we are equally justified in believing either.  I believe I've demonstrated why that is not the case.

[jomike]

Your proposed Theist opponent never addresses the point of my post -- which is that untestable theories that are consistent with scientific knowledge are preferred to untestable theories that are not -- the implication of which is that we should embrace the multiverse theory over the intelligent designer theory.

"But, with respect, such hard scientific knowledge as we do have supports both your multiverse and my Creator hypotheses equally well.  That you personally find the Creator hypothesis implausible says nothing one way or the other about its actual plausibility, or lack thereof."  Theist paused thoughtfully.   "Again, if evidence surfaces that suggests the physical existence of multiple universes -- as opposed to the conjectures of atheistically-minded astrophysicists and cosmologists -- then I will gladly revise my position."

He/she simply proclaims that we are equally justified in believing either.  I believe I've demonstrated why that is not the case.

Theist rubbed his chin.  "I don't think you've demonstrated any such thing.  You've claimed that the multiverse is the likelier hypothesis, but we have as yet no evidence one way or other.  The evidence we do have firmly supports a single universe beginning in a Big Bang.  Beyond that there is only conjecture."

[andrewclunn]

Hey guys, put your best manners on, I tweeted about this thread so we're going to get a lot of guests!

Crap.  Okay teethering.  In the name of "best manners" please explain to me why it is much more likely that a container universe based on probability would give rise to several causal universes of different natures rather than a sentient being.

We cannot speak to likelihood given sample of 1.

We can compare explanation in terms of the complexity of what they insert as the cause.  The problem with inserting intelligence and sentience into any explanation is that intelligence is incredibly complex.  Even your run-of-the-mill human intelligence (which is nowhere sufficient enough to create a universe) is a complex interaction of a multitude of distinct complex-in-their-own-right abilities, like perceiving, processing information, aggregating results, planning action based on it, and then also being able to manipulate the environment and loop it all together into one coherent whole.  Intelligence is not a simple explanation for anything and any time you insert it, there better be a good reason.  If you're going to posit godly intelligence, i.e. intelligence that's capable of designing a universe and having the physical ability to do so, that ups the ante even more.

Such reason is absent in the question of prime mover.  What's required is an acausal cause, something where we can say everything begins and where the infinite regression stops.  The requirement for that prime cause to also be sentient have to come from elsewhere, something else has to justify why such complexity is necessary.  There's nothing inherently intelligent about something being acausal.

And the problem of essentially "something from nothing" is an open problem to all explanations of the origins of the universe.  It's the end point to all "and how does that work?" causal regressions and multiverse and intelligent design and all the rest of the explanations have this same problem.  We just don't know how something comes from nothing.  Multiverse doesn't address that in the slightest, it does, however address the question of the apparent "design-ness" of the universe and therefore it addresses the same question that making the creator of the universe super intelligent would.

Okay, I think you completely missed my point.  I am not suggesting that 'God' would have to be the very initial cause, but that if at any point back in the process of infinite regression we come across sentience, then we have an entity that qualifies as 'God.'