Interesting article, thanks.
I've been reading a bit on
Dan Kahan's work specifically how it relates to how science informs our views on politically polarizing topics. I thought that maybe this finding would have a similar cause as what Kahan and others have found in their research.
They were saying that additional science information increases polarization, because with more knowledge individuals are better able to justify their intuited or group-influenced positions. But the research in the New Yorker article was saying that the intuitive thinking itself was worse in people scoring higher on measures of smartness.
I'm trying to figure out why that is. The proposed explanation in the article doesn't really make sense to me, although I might just not be understanding what it's trying to say. If it's that "smarter" people are more likely to go with bad intuition because they are more likely to believe their intuition is good, that might make some sense, but I got the impression that the study measured the intuition itself rather than how likely subjects were to use it. Can anybody clarify that for me?
