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Anti-God just as likely as God, Peter Millican.

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vespine:
Thanks Joemike! I've been watching heaps of these debates lately, I'm really enjoying them. And I have 2 hours commute on the train each day so it's easy for me to get through them.

I did see the law v craig one since starting this thread. I think you're right, law did concentrate a little too much, imho, on the evil god argument and he really failed to see "eye to eye" regarding Craig's "cumilitive case". I thought he came across a little obtuse at certain points. Maybe only because I didn't quite grasp the point HE was trying to make, but it seemed he wasn't trying very hard to see Craig's point either, which in a debate i think you kind of have to do to be able to effectivley counter your opponent.

The 'other' thing which really bugs me is how Craig, in almost of his debates ends up saying that his opponent is arguing moral epistemology, but he's talking about moral ontology, AND HE'S RIGHT! It seems like most of his opponents reply to the moral argument by saying something like "atheists are just as moral as theists", but that's not the point and a lot of Craig's opponents seem not to "get it".

It's obviously easy to comment when you can sit back with time to analyse what's been said and chew your thoughts over, i'm sure it would be a completely different matter to be on the spot on that stage.

I have not seen the 4 debates you linked yet, so thanks.

I've read and thoroughly enjoyed Stenger's God: The Failed Hypothesis, so i'm looking forward to hearing that one!

I also watched Millican's philosophy primer lecture series, it's available in audio and video from itunes university, I think it's somewhere on the oxford website too.

jomike:

--- Quote from: vespine on Jul 25, 2012, 12:35:08 AM ---I've read and thoroughly enjoyed Stenger's God: The Failed Hypothesis
--- End quote ---

Thanks for the recommend.  That one hasn't shown up at my library so I guess I gotta pony up for it.

BTW Chris Hallquist over at freethoughtblogs just finished a series of posts you might enjoy that address WLC's arguments in some detail.

jomike:
Also too, since I've had a couple beers & don't feel like watching the Olympics just now:


--- Quote from: vespine on Jul 25, 2012, 12:35:08 AM ---I did see the law v craig one since starting this thread. I think you're right, law did concentrate a little too much, imho, on the evil god argument and he really failed to see "eye to eye" regarding Craig's "cumilitive case". I thought he came across a little obtuse at certain points. Maybe only because I didn't quite grasp the point HE was trying to make, but it seemed he wasn't trying very hard to see Craig's point either, which in a debate i think you kind of have to do to be able to effectivley counter your opponent.
--- End quote ---

I agree with you that Law didn't refute all the points of Craig's "cumulative case," but I don't think he set out to do that.  I think Law's intent was to focus on the evidentiary problem of evil.  That he did, brilliantly IMO, by pressing his "evil god" hypothesis.  Most of Craig's debate opponents wander off into the weeds in a futile attempt to address every one of his wildly disparate Gish-like points.  Law avoided that trap.


--- Quote from: vespine on Jul 25, 2012, 12:35:08 AM ---The 'other' thing which really bugs me is how Craig, in almost of his debates ends up saying that his opponent is arguing moral epistemology, but he's talking about moral ontology, AND HE'S RIGHT! It seems like most of his opponents reply to the moral argument by saying something like "atheists are just as moral as theists", but that's not the point and a lot of Craig's opponents seem not to "get it".
--- End quote ---

Craig often carps that his opponents fail to distinguish moral epistemology from moral ontology.  It's a standard move of his, but it's a bit slippery because it begs the question under discussion.  To discuss ontology is to discuss something that is; to discuss moral ontology is to presuppose the existence of the thing being discussed -- but that's the very point at issue.  Richard Carrier explains:


--- Quote ---What, then, is the ontological status of moral values?

To ask for something's ontological status is to ask for what actual features of the universe a word or phrase refers to. For example, the ontological status of cows is pretty straightforward: to say that cows exist is to say that there are actual atoms and cells arranged in a particular way somewhere that conforms to the minimal defining properties of a cow. In other words, a cow physically exists, and we can go point to one, kick it, gut it, weigh it, eat it, or launch it over the wall of a castle stuffed with dead monkeys, or what have you.

The ontological status of dragons, however, is more complex....

...Now to go from complex ontologies to moral ontology we have to stop at (yet) another station in between: other kinds of values (other than "moral" values specifically). For example, monetary value. What is the ontological status of monetary value?

For example, what is the ontological difference between a $100,000 diamond ring and a fake?

...That is the difference between purely subjective values and partly objective values. Ultimately, however, all value reduces to what you want, such that if you no longer want something, it no longer has value for you. Individual desire remains therefore the ontological root of all value: just as real dragons only exist when atoms are arranged in such a way as to produce a living dragon, so values only exist when people's brains are arranged in such a way as to produce desires for certain outcomes.

In Christian theology the same holds: if no one values x, not even God, then x simply has no value. Therefore value always reduces to desire (such as "what God wants"). And if only God values x, there is no sense in which x is of any value to anyone else--unless they can be shown that they already value something else (such as y) that they would be more likely to obtain if they also valued x (and therefore they ought to value x, because they already want y, and valuing x gains y).
--- End quote ---

That sort of subjective, multi-layered complexity doesn't come across in a rapid-fire debate.  It isn't that Craig's opponents don't understand what he means by the phrase "moral ontology."  They aren't ignoring him, they certainly do "get" it.  It's just that they reject his oversimplified framing, and refuse to respond on his terms.  The standard debate format doesn't allow time for anything like a proper discussion of the matter.  I suspect Craig is perfectly aware of this, and that that business about moral epistemology vs. moral ontology is smoke-blowing, inserted in order to impress (and score points with) his lay audiences.

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